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April 7, 2009 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the consequences of a series of Swedish policy changes beginning in 
1989 where different regions started subsidizing the birth control pill. The reforms were 
significant and applied to all types of oral contraceptives. My identification strategy takes 
advantage of the fact that the reforms were implemented successively over time and targeted 
specific cohorts of young women, in particular teenagers. This generates plausibly exogenous 
variation in access to the subsidy. The paper first demonstrates that access significantly 
increased pill use. Using regional, temporal, and cohort variation in access, I then go on to 
examine the impact on abortions. The estimates show that the subsidy significantly decreased 
the abortion rate by about 8 percent. Furthermore, long-term access decreased the likelihood of 
teenage childbearing by about 20 percent. However, there is no significant effect on labor 
supply, marriage, educational attainment or welfare take-up.    
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2 IFAU  – Putting teenagers on the pill: the consequences of subsidized contraception 1 Introduction 
Unintended childbearing is both frequent and widespread, especially among young 
women. The social and economic costs of unintended childbearing are potentially large 
since these births are associated with poor socioeconomic and health outcomes of both 
mothers and children. In addition, unwanted pregnancies account for approximately 1.5 
million abortions annually in the U.S. alone (Institute of Medicine 1995). These 
concerns have motivated policy makers to instigate a wide range of family planning 
programs.
1 Despite the vast interest in such interventions there is however very scarce 
evidence on the efficiency of different policies.  
This paper investigates the consequences of a series of Swedish policy changes 
beginning in 1989 where different regions started subsidizing the birth control pill. The 
reforms were significant and applied to all types of oral contraceptives. The subsidy rate 
was on average 75 percent. My identification strategy takes advantage of the fact that 
the reforms were implemented successively over time and targeted specific cohorts of 
young women, in particular teenagers. This generates plausibly exogenous variation in 
access to the subsidy, which is used to investigate the impact on abortions, fertility, 
marriage, educational attainment, and labor supply.  
The main argument for subsidizing the birth control pill for teenagers is that young 
women may lack stable income sources, and therefore are more likely to prematurely 
end or delay the course of the treatment. Since the timing of the treatment is crucial for 
its success even short interruptions from the programme increases the risk of an 
unintended pregnancy. Still, it is not obvious that the demand for contraception is price 
elastic. Women who consider the cost of pregnancy as very high may either choose to 
completely abstain from sex or always pay the cost of getting the pill. Thus, it is not 
certain that subsidizing the pill will lead to a behavioral response. Furthermore, having 
access to inexpensive contraceptives could mean that women raise their level of sexual 
activity, increasing the likelihood of a pregnancy. This makes the net effect on fertility 
                                                 
1 The Institute of Medicine (1995) reports that there are more than 200 local programs operating in the U.S. that in 
some way address unintended pregnancy.  
 
IFAU – Putting teenagers on the pill: the consequences of subsidized contraception  3 ambiguous. If women substitute between the ”pill” and other not as effective contra-
ceptive methods in order to avoid unwanted births, a subsidy that changes the relative 
price between these technologies can potentially also affect the abortion rate.  
There are several reasons for why easier access to oral contraceptives could matter 
for socioeconomic outcomes as well. The most obvious mechanisms are: delayed 
childbearing, smaller families or reduced risk of shot-gun marriages.
2 Additionally, it 
has been suggested that oral contraceptives may raise the returns to investments in 
education and work by reducing uncertainty about future interruptions from the labor 
market and school (Bailey 2006; Goldin and Katz 2002; Weiss 1986; Mincer and 
Polachek 1974). This means that a subsidy can have a direct effect on socioeconomic 
outcomes. A similar story is provided by Chiappori and Oreffice (2007) who propose 
that access to oral contraceptives may improve the woman’s bargaining position within 
a couple, leading to an increased share of the household’s resources; something that 
potentially could reduce female labor supply through a standard income effect.  
The topic of this paper is related to a series of recent studies highlighting the role of 
the birth control pill for women’s well-being. Ananat and Hungerman (2007), Bailey 
(2006), Goldin and Katz (2002), and Guldi (2007) exploit cross-state and cross-time 
variation in different groups’ access to the birth control pill in the U.S. in the 1960s and 
1970s. The results suggest that access to the pill increased labor supply, lead to later age 
at first marriage, delayed childbearing, and reduced the abortion rate. Bailey (2007) 
takes advantage of variation in state laws regulating contraceptive sales from 1873 to 
1965 (Comstock laws) and shows that access to the pill accelerated the reduction in 
U.S. fertility rates. More closely related to my paper is Kearney and Levine (2008) who 
examine the consequences of state-level Medicaid policy changes that expanded 
eligibility for family planning services to higher income women and to Medicaid clients 
whose benefits would expire otherwise. The results indicate that the reforms led to a 
                                                 
2 Studies of the link between fertility, marriage, and socioeconomic outcomes include: Ashcraft and Lang (2007); 
Åslund and Grönqvist (2007); Holmlund (2005); Hotz, Mullins and Sanders (1997); Kearney and Levine (2007); 
Klepinger, Lundberg and Plotnick (1999); Maynard (1996); Stevenson and Wolfers (2007).  
4 IFAU  – Putting teenagers on the pill: the consequences of subsidized contraception nine percent decrease in births to eligible women age 20–44; a finding that is attributed 
to greater contraceptive use.
3   
My paper adds to this literature in several ways. First and foremost, it is the first to 
evaluate the social and economic consequences of subsidized oral contraceptives. As 
already suggested, this is a question of great interest for policy makers. The fact that the 
subsidy focused on a group of individuals often targeted in various preventive programs 
makes the policy relevance even clearer. Second, the impact of a recent subsidy is 
arguably more relevant for the contemporary debate over contraception since most 
countries already have introduced the birth control pill. Third, the rich data used makes 
it possible to study a wide variety of different outcomes, and to examine differential 
effects with respect to socioeconomic background.  
I begin the empirical analysis by exploiting county level panel data to examine the 
relationship between the subsidy and the sales of oral contraceptives. The results 
suggest that the subsidy increased sales by on average 5–7 percent, and there is 
suggestive evidence that this effect is larger for teenagers. I go on to study the impact on 
abortions. Using regional, temporal and cohort variation in access, I find that the 
subsidy reduced the abortion rate by about 8 percent. The analysis also shows tentative 
evidence of an effect on the birth rate, although the estimate is marginally insignificant 
at the 5 percent level. The estimates are robust to several sensitivity checks.  
The last part of the paper uses population micro data to examine the effects on 
fertility, labor supply, educational attainment, and marriage. The results show that 
women with long-term access to the subsidy (>4.5 years) are 20 percent less likely to 
have a child before age 21. Consistent with the notion that access to inexpensive 
contraceptives matters more for financially constrained individuals this effect is found 
to be significantly stronger for women from poor socioeconomic background. However, 
I find no statistically significant effect on number of children, marriage, educational 
attainment, or labor supply; although some of the coefficients are relatively imprecisely 
estimated.   
                                                 
 
3 In a broader context my paper is related to studies on the impact of abortion policies on women’s outcomes and to a 
large literature on the relationship between birth control programmes and fertility in developing countries; see e.g. 
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background and presents evidence on the relationship between the subsidy and the sales 
of oral contraceptives. Section 3 uses county level panel data to examine the impact on 
abortions and birth rate. Section 4 contains an analysis of economic and demographic 
outcomes based on population micro data. Section 5 concludes.      
2 Background 
Since its introduction in 1964 the birth control pill has grown to become the leading 
contraceptive method among young Swedish women (Santow and Bracher 1999).
4 The 
aim of this section is to describe the institutional setting surrounding the birth control 
pill. I then investigate whether the subsidy affected women’s use of the pill.     
2.1 Institutional  setting
5 
In Sweden, oral contraceptives are sold by prescription from a doctor or midwife. The 
typical procedure for a young woman wishing to use the pill is to schedule an 
appointment at a youth clinic to meet with a physician. Youth clinics are health centers 
for teenagers that offer free consultation about contraception as well as associated 
medical examinations. Virtually all municipalities have at least one clinic. Individuals 
are also free to visit any private or public health care institution, but the process is still 
the same. If the physician deems oral contraceptives appropriate she prescribes the drug 
and the girl can then collect it at the state pharmacy.
 Parental consent to the treatment is 
not required. The physician is bound by the professional secrecy and if a girl does not 
want her parents to know about the treatment the physician cannot contact them. It is 
however common practice that the doctor or midwife in these cases tries to convince the 
girl to tell her parents.   
                                                                                                                                               
Gruber, Ananat and Levine (2007), Gruber, Ananat, Levine and Staiger (2006), Gertler and Molyneaux (1994), 
Miller (2005), Prichett (1994).   
4 Almost 60 percent of Swedish women age 18–24 regularly use oral contraceptives (National Board of Health and 
Welfare, 2001).   
5 This section draws heavily on Csillag (1993), National Board of Health and Welfare (1994, 2001, 2005) and 
Västragötalandsregionen (2000)..  
6 IFAU  – Putting teenagers on the pill: the consequences of subsidized contraception The question of providing financial support for oral contraceptives targeted to young 
women was raised in the late 1980s. The Swedish government had since 1974 been 
directing large resources towards various family planning policies, including a national 
subsidy on oral contraceptives for all women. However, in 1984 the discount was abol-
ished and the price of the pill quadrupled. The new policy also required users to renew 
prescriptions no later than every 3 months, instead of once a year, which of course 
meant that using the pill would call for more planning. Immediately after the policy 
change the sales of oral contraceptives started to fall and many youth clinics reported 
that teenage girls had begun to interrupt their treatment. Following a period of decreas-
ing teenage abortion rates, abortions started to increase.
6 These events seem to have 
been what motivated the new reforms.   
As the first region, the municipality of Gävle started subsidizing oral contraceptives 
for teenagers in 1989. The reform was evaluated by the local authorities and the results 
showed that the consumption of oral contraceptives among teenagers increased from 42 
to 60 percent after subsidy was introduced.
7 Moreover, the teenage abortion rate fell by 
almost 50 percent. The experiment was considered as a success and in the following 
years other regions therefore launched policies based on the same principle as in Gävle, 
meaning that the subsidy targeted specific cohorts of young women. The subsidy rate 
was on average 75 percent and applied to all types of oral contraceptives (National 
Board of Health and Welfare 1994).
8 When introduced the policy temporarily received 
large attention from the local media and posters with information were printed and 
highlighted at the youth clinics.   
Table 1 contains a description of the reforms up to 1993, which is the last year for 
which this information is available. Observe that most of the regions which introduced 
the subsidy are counties, but some municipalities also participated. By the end of 1993 
eight counties had still not implemented the reform.
9 From Table 1 it is clear that both 
the starting dates and targeted cohorts vary across regions and that only two areas 
                                                 
6 Abortions have been allowed in Sweden on demand and basically free of charge since 1975 (Santow and Bracher, 
1999).  
7 The evaluation consisted of a simple before and after analysis.  
8 Unfortunately, I do not have access to information about the regional specific subsidy rates.  
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the reforms did not overlap with other major changes in Swedish family policy 
(Björklund 2006).     
Table 1 The implementation of the reforms 
Regions which introduced the subsidy before 1994  Starting date  Eligible  
cohorts 
Gävle (municipality)  Nov 01, 1989  ≤ 19
* 
Sandviken (municipality)  Nov 30, 1989  ≤ 19
* 
Partille (municipality)  Jan 01, 1990  ≤ 20 
Hofors (municipality) and Ockelbo (municipality)  Mar 31, 1990  ≤ 19
* 
Örebro (county)  Jun 01, 1990  ≤ 18
* 
Kristianstad (county)  Nov 29, 1990  ≤ 18
* 
Kronoberg (county)  Jan 01, 1991  ≤ 19 
Blekinge (county)  Mar 01, 1991  ≤ 19 
Solna (municipality)  Sep 01, 1991  ≤ 22 
Gotland (county)   Oct 01, 1991  ≤ 20
* 
Södermanland (county)  Jan 01, 1992  ≤ 19
* 
Malmöhus (county) (except Malmö municipality), Västernorrland 
(county), Älvsborg (county), Västmanland (county), Kopparberg 
(county)  
Jan 01, 1992  ≤ 19 
Värmland (county)  Mar 01, 1992  ≤ 24
* 
Jämtland (county)  Apr 01, 1992  ≤ 24 
Göteborg (county) and Bohuslän (county) (except for Partille and 
Göteborg municipalities)   
Jul 01, 1992  ≤ 20 
Gävleborg (county) (except for Gävle, Sandviken, Hofors and Ockelbo 
municipalities) 
Nov 09, 1992  ≤ 19
* 
Uppsala (county)  Mar 01, 1993  ≤ 19 
Malmö (municipality)  Mar 26, 1993  ≤ 18 
Halland (county)  Jul 01, 1993  ≤ 19 
Regions which did not introduce the subsidy before 1994     
Stockholm (county) (except for Solna municipality); Östergötaland (county); Jönköping (county); 
Kalmar (county); Göteborg (municipality); Skaraborg (county); Västerbotten (county); Norrbottens 
(county);  
* Individuals are eligible for the subsidy until the calendar year they turn this age.  
 
Prior to the reforms, a full year’s supply of the birth control pill sold for just below USD 
100 (in 2008 year’s price level).
 10 Although the price might seem fairly low, for young 
teenage girls without own incomes the costs of obtaining oral contraceptives could very 
well amount to a large fraction of their budget. This situation is especially likely to be 
problematic for girls that for some reason can not ask their parents for money to get the 
pill, and is worsened by the strong regularity requirements surrounding the treatment 
                                                                                                                                               
9 The fact that some regions may have implemented a subsidy after 1993 introduces some complications for my 
analysis; an issue I will return to later in the paper.     
8 IFAU  – Putting teenagers on the pill: the consequences of subsidized contraception programme. In order for oral contraceptives to provide maximum protection against 
pregnancy the treatment must proceed for 21 days followed by a seven day recess. If 
these conditions are not fulfilled, protection is immediately endangered. In fact, anec-
dotal evidence from youth clinics prior to the reforms suggests that many unintended 
pregnant girls stated that they had not been able to start a new treatment because they 
could not afford the pill at the day the program was scheduled to begin and therefore 
had been forced to postpone the treatment (National Board of Health and Welfare, 
1994).  
2.2  The impact on sales and consumption 
Did the subsidy really increase the use of the pill? To answer this question I use 
information from the state pharmacy (Apoteket) on the total sales of oral contraceptives 
in each county and year starting in 1980. The state pharmacy is the sole provider of 
prescriptive drugs in Sweden, so sales should provide a good proxy for consumption. 
Sales are reported in terms of the annual number of (defined) daily dosages sold per 
woman age 15–44.
11 
Before proceeding to the econometric analysis it is useful to start the examination by 
graphically illustrating how sales have evolved over time. Figure 1 plots sales by year 
from 1980 through 2000. We can see that sales increase up until 1984, after which there 
is a sharp decline. This decline coincides perfectly with the abolishment of the major 
nationwide subsidy of oral contraceptives described earlier. The vertical line marks the 





                                                                                                                                               
10 The price varied slightly depending on the type of product but there was no regional variation in prices prior to the 
reforms.  
11 The measure takes into account varying content of hormones in different products.    
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Figure 1 Number of (defined) daily dosages sold per woman by year 
Notes: Vertical line marks the starting year of the reforms. 
 
Although suggestive, one cannot be certain from the graphical evidence that no 
unobserved factors affecting sales occurred simultaneously as the reforms. One such 
factor could be increased awareness of the risks associated with HIV/AIDS. To rule out 
potential confounders I turn to a more formal analysis by estimating regressions of the 
following form  
 
(1)     ct c t c ct ct t Policy Sales ε μ ρ μ μ β + × + + + = ) ( 
 
where  is the (log) number of dosages sold per woman age 15–44 living in county 
c in year t.  is a dummy for the county having implemented the subsidy; 
ct Sales
Policyct c μ  is a 
set of county fixed effects;  t μ  is a set of year fixed effects;  t c × μ  is a set of linear 
county trends.  
This is a standard difference-in-differences specification where the county-specific 
fixed effects take into account all persistent county characteristics affecting sales, such 
as permanent differences in fertility, access to family planning services, etc. Similarly, 
year fixed effects control for all time-varying factors that affect sales in different 
counties in the same way, e.g. changes in the national family policy. Linear trends 
10 IFAU  – Putting teenagers on the pill: the consequences of subsidized contraception control for smoothly evolving factors within each county. The model assumes that no 
unobserved regional-specific events affecting sales happened at the same time as the 
introduction of the subsidy. A total of 19 counties observed from 1980 through 1993 are 
included in the analysis.
12  
The results from the regressions can be found in Table 2. Column (1) presents 
estimates excluding linear county trends, i.e.  0 = ρ . The reported standard errors are 
robust to serial correlation at the county level. The coefficient suggests that the subsidy 
increased sales by just below 7 percent. The estimate is highly significant. Nevertheless, 
one should bear in mind that, because there are rather few counties, the standard errors 
may understate the standard deviation of the estimator (Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mullainathan 2004). Column (2) shows that the coefficient is robust to including linear 
county trends.  
One potential concern is that regions which introduced the subsidy even in its 
absence would have experienced increased sales. To investigate this I have run regres-
sions exploring the relationship between future subsidies (t+2 years) and current sales. 
If causality runs from the subsidy to sales then one should find that future subsidies do 
not affect current sales, conditional on current policy.
  13 The results are displayed in 
column (3). As can be seen, the coefficient on current policy is still significant and the 
estimate virtually unchanged. In contrast, the coefficient on future policy is insig-
nificant.   
                                                 
12 The following counties are excluded from the analysis due to limited availability of data: Älvsborgs län, Bohuslän, 
Kristianstads län, Malmöhus län, Skaraborgs län. Note also that I cannot use information for later years since some 
regions may have introduced the subsidy after 1993.   
13 To be specific, Policy(t+2) is a dummy that switches from zero to one two years before the implementation of the 
subsidy and stays on. The reason for choosing t+2 years is as follows. In counties where the policy was introduced 
late during the year I have coded the reform to the subsequent year, implying that I do not control perfectly for 
current policy. This means that the estimate could capture some of the effect of current policy. Using t+2 alleviates 
this potential problem. Note that the results are similar when using other years than t+2. This “falsification” test has 
previously been used by Lochner and Moretti (2004), Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2004) and Dahl (2005) to 
investigate the exogeneity of compulsory schooling laws.  
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Table 2 OLS estimates of the effect of the subsidy on the sales of oral contraceptives 
Dependent variable: Log(Number of dosages sold per woman)    
   (1)   (2)  (3) 
Policy   .068    
(.025) 
.047    
(.018) 
.044   
(.017) 
Policy(t+2)   -  -  .025    
(.021) 
County fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Linear county trends  No  Yes  Yes 
N  266 266 266 
Notes: Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the county level (19 cells) in 
parenthesis. The sample consists of a panel of all Swedish counties (except Älvsborgs län, Bohuslän, 
Kristianstads län, Malmöhus län, Skaraborgs län), observed from 1980 through 1993.  
  
Note that these regressions estimate the average effect of the subsidy across all cohorts 
and therefore cannot tell how much of the effect is due increased pill use among 
teenagers. To perform a cohort specific analysis I make use of a survey called ULF 
(Undersökningen av Levnadsförhållanden). The survey asks women age 16–84 whether 
they have consumed oral contraceptives within the last two weeks prior to the survey 
date. The question was asked in one round before the reforms and one round “after” 
(1980/81 and 1996/97). The survey consists of a (cross-sectional) random sample of 
about 3,500 Swedish women and the sample size net of attrition is sufficiently large to 
disaggregate the data by age cohort.
14 
15 Statistics Sweden compiled the data on my 
behalf.  
In the first round, 25.8 percent of 16–20 year olds stated that they had consumed oral 
contraceptives within the last two weeks. The same figure for 21–24 year olds is 35.8 
percent, and 25.2 percent for 25–30 year olds. All cohorts increased their use of the pill 
up to the second round where the corresponding numbers are: 35, 45.9 and 30.6 percent. 
This means that consumption grew by 36 percent for the youngest cohort, 28 percent for 
                                                 
14 Attrition in ULF is generally around 25 percent.  
15 Unfortunately, sample size restrictions, in combination with the fact that some regions may have implemented the 
reforms after 1993, prevents me from disaggregating the data by region.  
12 IFAU  – Putting teenagers on the pill: the consequences of subsidized contraception individuals age 21–24, and 21 percent for 25–30 year olds. Thus, the increase in con-
sumption use was indeed largest in the eligible cohorts.
16    
Taken together, I believe that the results presented in this sub-section provide 
credible evidence that the subsidy actually did increase the use of oral contraceptives 
among young women.  
3  The impact on abortions and birth rate 
Having established that the subsidy increased pill use I now investigate whether access 
to it affected the likelihood that a woman had an abortion, as well as the consequences 
for the birth rate. The analysis makes use of publicly available data on all legal 
abortions performed in Swedish counties from 1985 and onwards. This information was 
obtained from the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen).
17 The only 
related study in any field that I am aware of is Ananat and Hungerman (2007) who use 
cross-state and cross-time variation in the pill’s diffusion at the time when it was 
introduced in the U.S. to explore whether access to the pill affected the risk of a young 
unmarried woman having an abortion. When analyzing the birth rate I use aggregated 
data from the IFAU-database.
18 My baseline estimates are obtained from the following 
model  
 
(2)     cat at ct ca t a c cat cat v γPolicy Outcome + + + + + + + = θ θ θ θ θ θ  
 
where c, a, and t denote county, age cohort (five year intervals) and year, respectively. 
The outcome is either the (log) abortion rate or the (log) birth rate. The θ ’s represents 
fixed effects for county, age cohort, year, and all of their interactions.    
This model is very flexible and takes into account most potential confounders. The 
fixed effects control for nationwide changes in the outcome over time, time-invariant 
                                                 
16 Of course, this can be due to a range of different factors not related to the reforms and the results should therefore 
be interpreted with caution. The most obvious concern is that the Swedish women may have brought forward their 
sexual debut. However, the average age at first intercourse has been stable around age 16 since the 1960s (Forsberg 
2005).   
17 The data can be found on the following web-page: http://www.socialstyrelsen.se/  
IFAU – Putting teenagers on the pill: the consequences of subsidized contraception  13 county characteristics, permanent differences across cohorts, within-county and within-
cohort shocks, as well as the fact that permanent county-specific differences could 
matter more for different cohorts. The identifying assumption is that there should be no 
unobserved county specific shocks occurring simultaneously as the introduction of the 
subsidy which also affect the relative outcomes between cohorts.  
The results are shown in Table 3. As a benchmark, I start by providing evidence on 
the impact of the subsidy on teenage abortions, relying only on cross-county and cross-
time variation in the introduction of the policies. The specification is analogous to 
equation (1) and to the model used by Ananat and Hungerman (2007), who find that 
access to the pill lowered the teenage abortion rate from 27 abortions per every 1000 
women to 22, implying a decrease of about 18 percent.  Column (1) shows that the 
subsidy decreased the number of teenage abortions by about 6 percent.  
The fact that my estimates are smaller in magnitude than those presented by Ananat 
and Hungerman (2007) is natural since the introduction of the birth control pill in the 
US in the 1960s and 1970s is likely to have had larger consequences for the use of oral 
contraceptives. For instance, compared to my result showing that access to the subsidy 
increased sales by about 7 percent (cf. Table 2), Goldin and Katz (2002) finds that more 
lenient state regulations regarding minors was associated with 33–40 percent greater pill 
use by young unmarried women.   
As already mentioned, column (1) assumes that no other events affecting the 
outcome occurred in the same year as the subsidy was introduced. Column (2) relaxes 
this assumption by using older not eligible cohorts as control groups. Even if an 
unobserved shock occurred simultaneously as the subsidy this will not bias the 
estimates as long as it does not also affect the relative abortion rate between different 
cohorts. Column (2) shows that the estimates are similar to those in column (1). The 
estimate is statistically significant and the coefficient suggests that the abortion rate is 
reduced by about 8 percent.  
Last, by the same argument as earlier, column (3) tests the exogeneity of the subsidy 
by investigating the relationship between future subsidies and the current abortion rate. 
                                                                                                                                               
18 The database is described in detail in Section 4.  
14 IFAU  – Putting teenagers on the pill: the consequences of subsidized contraception As can be seen, the coefficient on future policy is close to zero and insignificant, 
suggesting that the policies indeed were exogenous.  
Table 3 OLS estimates of the effect of the subsidy on the abortion rate 
Dependent variable:    









Policy   –.060     
(.031) 
–.080     
(.033) 
–.077    
(.036) 
Policy(t+2)  -  -  –.007    
(.032) 
County fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cohort fixed effects  -  Yes  Yes 
N  171 684 684 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Additionally, the standard errors in column (1) are robust 
to serial correlation at the county level. The sample consists of a panel of all Swedish counties (except 
Älvsborgs län, Bohuslän, Kristianstads län, Malmöhus län, Skaraborgs län), observed from 1985 
through 1993. The regressions in column (1) cover the teenage abortion rate and the unit of observation 
are all teenagers age 15–19, in a given county and year. The regressions in column (2) cover the 
abortion rate for all women in the following age cohorts: 15–19, 20–24. 25–29, 30–34, and the unit of 
observation are all women in each cell. In addition to county, year and cohort fixed effects, columns (2) 
and (3) include all interactions between these variables.  
 
Table 4 examines the consequences of the subsidy for the birth rate.
19 The empirical 
approach is identical to the one used when analyzing the abortion rate. Column (1) 
shows results for the teenage birth rate. We can see that the subsidy decreased the 
teenage birth rate by about 7.5 percent. The estimate is however not significant. Column 
(2) uses older cohorts as control groups within each county-by-year cell. The estimate is 
basically identical to that in column (1) and the precision has increased, a finding that is 
natural since the number of observations has increased. Still, the coefficient is 
insignificant at the 5 percent level (p-value = .075). Column (3) tests the exogeneity of 
the policy by adding a dummy for future policy. As earlier, this coefficient is close to 
zero and insignificant.  
                                                 
19 For comparison purposes I include the same set of counties and cohorts in the analysis as in Table 3. Note however 
the results are virtually identical to using all counties and cohorts.    
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Table 4 OLS estimates of the effect of the subsidy on the birth rate 
Dependent variable:    









Policy   –.076    
(.054) 
–.075    
(.042) 
–.090    
(.045) 
Policy(t+2)  -  -  .033    
(.040) 
County fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cohort fixed effects  -  Yes  Yes 
N  171 684 684 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Additionally, the standard errors in column (1) are robust to 
serial correlation at the county level. The sample consists of a panel of all Swedish counties (except 
Älvsborgs län, Bohuslän, Kristianstads län, Malmöhus län, Skaraborgs län), observed from 1985 through 
1993. The regressions in column (1) cover the teenage birth rate and the unit of observation are all 
teenagers age 16–19, in a given county and year. The regressions in column (2) cover the birth rate for 
all women in the following age cohorts: 16–19, 20–24. 25–29, 30–34, and the unit of observation are all 
women in each cell. In addition to county, year and cohort fixed effects, columns (2) and (3) include all 
interactions between these variables.     
4  Consequences for socioeconomic outcomes, 
fertility and marriage 
This section examines the subsidy’s effect on women’s socioeconomic outcomes, 
fertility and marital status. The analysis exploits rich micro data covering the entire 
Swedish population age 16–65 during the period 1985–2004.
20 One part of the database 
includes annual information on standard individual characteristics (earnings, place of 
residence, etc). It also contains several registers with educational information, as well as 
a “multi-generation” register linking children to their biological parents.  
My sample consists of all Swedish women born during the period 1965–1975. The 
reason for this restriction is that including older cohorts increases the likelihood that 
some individuals may have left their homes at the time when I observe them, enhancing 
the risk of both measurement error and selective sorting. Furthermore, younger cohorts 
cannot be used since I only have detailed knowledge about the reforms up until 1993 
and wish to avoid the possibility that later cohorts in the control regions may have been 
                                                 
20 The information is taken from the IFAU-database and was originally collected by Statistics Sweden.   
16 IFAU  – Putting teenagers on the pill: the consequences of subsidized contraception exposed.
21 For most cohorts, region of residence is defined according to where the girl 
lived at age 16. Individuals born 1965–1968 are assigned a residential area depending 
on where they lived in 1985.      
All subjects are linked to their biological parents and information is added on each 
parent’s education and earnings in 1985. I then add information on the birth dates of the 
subjects’ children.
22 Using place of residence in combination with the subject’s birth 
date I construct a variable measuring the cumulative length of exposure to the subsidy, 
starting at age 14 and ending when she no longer is eligible.   
The empirical analysis focuses on several types of outcomes: fertility, marriage, 
educational attainment, and labor market status. Teenage childbearing is defined as 
having the first child no later than age 20. I also study whether the woman has 
completed university or high school. My data contain information on a wide range of 
labor market and income variables as well: annual earnings, employment status, welfare 
take-up, and disposable income. 
All outcomes are recorded in 2004 when the subjects are 29–39 years old. This 
avoids the possibility that some individuals may not have completed their education.
23 
Table A 1 contains a detailed description of how the variables have been constructed 
and from which registers the information has been collected. Table A 2 contains 
summary statistics.  
4.1 Main  results 
The empirical strategy takes advantage of cross-regional and cross-cohort variation in 
access to the subsidy to identify the parameters of interest. I estimate regression models 
of the following form   
 
(3)   ibm m m b i bm ibm v b X Exposure Outcome + × + + + + + = ) ( ' 2 1 0 λ δ λ λ α α α  
 
                                                 
21 I know that some regions did in fact introduce the subsidy after 1993, although I have no information on what 
cohorts were eligible or the exact starting date.  
22 Note that the multi-generation register contains information on the woman’s number of children and her children’s 
birth dates even though the children themselves may be too young to be included in the population sample of the 
database.    
23 The age restrictions imply that the estimates will not capture the impact of the subsidy on completed fertility.  
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 is a measure of the cumulative exposure to the subsidy;   is a vector of 
background characteristics;
bm Exposure i X
b λ and  m λ represents year of birth and municipality specific 
fixed effects, respectively;  b × m λ  represents municipality specific trends. The model 
ignores regional and cohort differences which are absorbed by the fixed effects. Thus, 
the identifying assumption is that once that I condition on region, cohort, and possibly 
also background characteristics, exposure should not be correlated to the error term, 
i.e. )] ( , , , [ )] , , [ b X v E b X Exposure v E m m b i ibm i bm ibm × = λ λ λ
                                                
( , m , b λ λ m × λ .   
The key variables of interest are four dummies indicating the cumulative exposure to 
the subsidy. The reference group is individuals with no exposure. I also present results 
from identical models except that exposure is defined linearly. All regressions include 
fixed effects for municipality of residence and year of birth. In addition, I control for 
each parent’s earnings and age, with dummies for each parent’s highest completed level 
of education (five levels), missing information on education or earnings, municipality 
specific linear trends, and immigrant status. All standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level to take into account possible serial correlation (286 cells).
24   
To conserve space, I do not report estimates for the control variables, but it is worth 
mentioning that these are all significant and display expected signs: having highly 
educated, as well as older parents, means a lower probability of becoming a teenage 
mother, fewer children, more schooling, higher earnings, a lower probability of being 
non-employed and receiving welfare, and higher disposable incomes. The same is true 
for children to high income parents.   
Table 5 contains results for fertility and marital status. I start by asking whether the 
subsidy affected family size. We can see in column (1) that the coefficients are 
monotonically decreasing in exposure length, suggesting a dose-response relationship. 
Still, the F-statistic which tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients on exposure are 
jointly equal to zero is insignificant.   
 
24 I have also experimented with accounting for intra-group correlation at the municipality×cohort level with similar 
results (cf. Moulton 1990).   
18 IFAU  – Putting teenagers on the pill: the consequences of subsidized contraception Column (2) displays results for the probability of becoming a teenage mother. We 
can see that women exposed to the subsidy for more than 54 months are on average 
about 20 percent (–.013/.067) less likely to become teenage mothers, although the effect 
of shorter exposure is more moderate. Also for this outcome there are clear indications 
of a dose-response relationship. The F-statistic rejects the null hypothesis of no joint 
effect. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the linear measure of exposure in Panel 
B. On average, each additional year of exposure reduces the probability of teenage 
motherhood by .3 percentage points. This implies that exposure for 5 years lowers the 
probability of teenage childbearing by 22 percent ((.003*5)/.067). These estimates are 
comparable to the results presented by Bailey (2006) who finds that the probability of 
experiencing the first birth by age 22 fell by 16 percent in states that had relaxed 
restrictions on older teens’ eligibility to the pill.  
The impact of long-term access is significant and it is relevant to ask whether the 
results make sense. In this context it is worth mentioning that these regressions cannot 
separate between age at first exposure and length of exposure: a cohort that experienced 
long-term exposure is also a cohort where the subjects were exposed early in life. If 
easier access to contraceptives is more important in the early teens this could potentially 
explain the relatively large effects.  
Last, column (3) examines the impact on the probability of marriage. This effect is ex 
ante ambiguous since better planned births may both decrease the likelihood of (shot-
gun) marriages as well as improve the quality of later marriage. The F-statistic in 
column (3) shows no significant effect of exposure to the subsidy on the probability of 
being currently married, although the coefficient on exposure for 37–54 months is 
significantly negative.  
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Table 5 OLS estimates of the effect of the subsidy on fertility and marital status 
Dependent variable:   
 
 










Exposed 1–18 months 
 
.004    
(.009) 
 




(.004)   
Exposed 19–36 months  –.010    
(.011) 




Exposed 37–54 months  –.015    
(.013) 
–.006    
(.003) 
–.013 
(.006)     
Exposed > 54 months  
 
–.017     
(.024) 
 
–.013    
(.005) 
–.013 
(.009)    
P-value of F-statistic    .447   .000   .269 
Panel B 
Years of exposure  
 
 
–.005    
(.004) 
 
–.003     
(.001) 
 
–.003    
(.002) 
Municipality fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year of birth fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Mean of dependent variable  1.452  .067  .391 
N 588,367  588,367  588,367 
Notes: The sample consists of all women born 1965–l975 All regressions controls for each parent’s 
earnings and age, and with dummies for each parent’s education (five levels), for missing information 
on education and earnings, and immigrant status. The regressions include linear municipality trends. The 
outcomes are observed in 2004. Parental characteristics are measured in 1985. Standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the municipality level (286 cells) are shown in parenthesis. 
The omitted category in Panel A is women with no exposure to the subsidy. Reported F-statistic tests the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients on exposure are jointly zero. See Table A 1. for definitions of the 
included variables.    
 
Next, I examine the impact of the subsidy on socioeconomic outcomes. Columns (1) 
and (2) in Table 6 provide results for educational attainment. We can see that exposure 
to the subsidy is neither statistically significantly related to the probability of graduating 
from high school, nor to the likelihood of completing university. The F-statistics, as 
well as the individual coefficients, are all insignificant. I have also run regressions using 
(imputed) years of schooling as dependent variable with similar results. This conclusion 
holds for labor supply as well: columns (3) – (6) find no statistically significant effect 
on the probability of being non-employed, annual earnings, the probability of receiving 
welfare, or disposable income; however a few point estimates are just marginally 
insignificant for disposable income.    
20 IFAU  – Putting teenagers on the pill: the consequences of subsidized contraception Given that I find a negative impact on the probability of teenage childbearing, it 
might at first glance seem surprising that there is no significant effect on socioeconomic 
outcomes. Furthermore, Bailey (2006) demonstrates that access to the pill before age 
22, at the time when it was introduced in the US, raised the number of hours worked. 
Still, the results should be interpreted having in mind that some of the coefficients are 
fairly imprecisely estimated.  
It is also relevant to ask how the estimates reconcile with past research on the 
consequences of early childbearing. To answer this question, consider the following 
thought experiment: if the entire (potential) effect of access to the pill on education is 
mediated through an effect on teenage childbearing, what would the results in previous 
studies imply for my estimates? The most credible Swedish study to date is Holmlund 
(2005) who uses within-family variation in childbearing decisions and shows that 
teenage motherhood decreases the average length of schooling by .59 years. Observe 
that my analysis is based on comparing outcomes across cohorts, while Holmlund’s 
analysis is executed at the individual level. Taken together, this paper and Holmlund’s 
results show that 3 out of 1000 individuals in the total population potentially prolonged 
their education by .59 years (cf. Table 5, Panel B, Column 2). This is not a particularly 
strong effect, and one that probably would be difficult to detect in the data.      
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Table 6 OLS estimates of the effect of the subsidy on socioeconomic outcomes 




























Exposed 1–18 months 
 
.001    
(.003) 
 
.001    
(.004) 
 
.001    
(.003) 
 
–.003     
(.011) 
 
.001    
(.002) 
 
.001    
(.004) 
Exposed 19–36 months  .001    
(.003) 
–.001     
(.005) 
–.000    
(.004) 
.007    
(.012) 
.001    
(.002) 
.005    
(.004) 
Exposed 37–54 months  –.001    
(.003) 
.001    
(.007) 
–.002    
(.005) 
.008    
(.014) 
.002    
(.002) 
.008    
(.005) 
Exposed > 54 months  
 
.002    
(.007) 
 
–.009    
(.013) 
–.007   
(.009) 
.013    
(.027) 
.008    
(.004) 
.018    
(.011) 
P-value of F-statistic  .894   .662   .906  .867   .205   .483 
Panel B 
Years of exposure  
 
–.000    
(.001) 
 
–.000    
(.002) 
 
–.001    
(.001) 
 
.003    
(.004) 
 
.000    
(.001) 
 
.002    
(.001) 
Municipality fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year of birth fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Mean of dependent variable  .931  .425  .176  7.120  .089  7.084 
N  587,503 587,503 587,503 517,733 584,890 585,744 
Notes: The sample consists of all women born 1965–l975. All regressions controls for each parent’s earnings and age, and with dummies for each 
parent’s education (five levels), for missing information on education and earnings, and immigrant status. The regressions include linear municipality 
trends. The outcomes are observed in 2004. Parental characteristics are measured in 1985. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation at the municipality level (286 cells) are shown in parenthesis. The omitted category in Panel A is women with no exposure to the subsidy. 
Reported F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients on exposure duration are jointly zero. See Table A 1. for definitions of the included 
variables.      IFAU – Putting teenagers on the pill: the consequences of subsidized contraception  23 
 
In summary, the results suggest that exposure to the subsidy significantly lowers the 
probability of teenage motherhood. However, I find no statistically significant effect on 
number of children, marriage, educational attainment, labor supply, or welfare take-up. 
Next, I assess the robustness of the estimates.   
4.2 Robustness  checks 
My identification strategy is based on several assumptions. First, the timing of the 
reforms should not be correlated with regional trends. Second, individuals should not 
respond to the policy by selectively moving. Although it is unlikely that families would 
change their residential area because of the subsidy I do provide some evidence on this 
issue by investigating what happens to the estimates when removing some key covar-
iates. Parents’ education and earnings is perhaps the variables most likely to be associ-
ated with selective relocation. If unobserved factors are at least equally as important as 
these observed characteristics, dropping the latter can provide insights as to whether 
omitted factors may be driving the results. If I find the estimates sensitive to removing 
covariates, then one might suspect that omitted variables are important as well. By the 
same argument, removing the municipality-specific trends can give information on the 
likelihood of differential trends biasing the estimates.  
Table 7 presents results where I successively remove covariates. To conserve space I 
only report estimates for the linear measure of exposure, but the results are similar when 
using dummies. Reassuring is that the coefficients are not sensitive to removing controls 
for parents’ education and earnings. In a few cases the results are somewhat sensitive to 
dropping linear trends. For instance, for the probability of graduating from university 
and logged disposable income the coefficients become almost significant at the 5 
percent level, and for number of children, the coefficient switches sign but stay insigni-
ficant. For the other outcomes, the coefficients are however quite stable and the overall 
conclusions still hold. The results highlight the importance to control for trends to 
account for slow-moving economic and demographic changes in each region.   
Table 7 Consequences of removing covariates 
Change in specification:    
 
Dependent variable: 
Estimate as in 























Number of Children 
 
–.005    
(.004) 
–.005    
(.003) 
–.005    
(.003) 




–.003     
(.001) 
–.003     
(.001)  
–.003     
(.001) 




–.003    
(.002) 
–.003    
(.002) 
–.003    
(.002) 
–.001    
(.001) 
Pr(High school graduate)  –.000    
(.001) 
–.000    
(.001) 
–.000    
(.001) 




–.000    
(.002) 
–.000    
(.002) 
–.000    
(.002) 




–.001    
(.002) 
–.000    
(.001) 
–.001    
(.001) 




.003    
(.004) 
.003    
(.004) 
.003    
(.004) 




.000    
(.001) 
.000    
(.001) 
.001    
(.001) 
–.000     
(.000) 
Log(Disposable income)  .002    
(.001) 
.002    
(.001) 
.003    
(.002) 
.003    
(.001) 
Notes: The table reports the coefficient on “Years of exposure”. The sample consists of women born 
1965–l975. All regressions control for municipality and year of birth fixed effects, each parent’s age, and 
immigrant status. All outcomes are observed in 2004. Parental characteristics are measured in 1985. 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the municipal level (286 cells) are 
shown in parenthesis. See Table A 1. for definitions of the included variables. 
 
4.3  Differential effects  
Since there are no strong indications that the results are driven by omitted factors I 
continue the analysis by examining whether the effect varies by family background 
characteristics. Table 8 displays estimates for the linear measure of exposure; however 
the results are not sensitive to how exposure is defined. Each cell represents a separate 
regression. The focus is on education and earnings. “Academic family” is defined as 
having at least one parent having completed at least theoretical/preparatory high school. 
“Non-Academic family” is defined as both parents having completed at most vocational 
high school education. Similarly, “High-income family” is defined as having at least 
one parent above the median in the earnings distribution (defined separately for mothers 
24 IFAU  – Putting teenagers on the pill: the consequences of subsidized contraception and fathers). A “Low-income family” is a family where both parents are below the 
median in their respective earnings distribution.    
We can see that the effect of exposure to the subsidy on teenage childbearing is 
significantly more negative for women from “Non-Academic” families, and there is also 
a tendency for stronger effects in “Low-income” families. These findings are consistent 
with the idea that access to inexpensive contraceptives may have more profound effects 
for financially constrained individuals. There are also indications of a negative effect on 
the likelihood of marriage for women from less educated families. However, I do not 
find any evidence of differential effects for the other outcomes.  
Table 8 Differential effects with respect to family background 
Change in sample:    
Dependent variable:  Estimate as 
in Tables 5 























Number of Children 
 
–.005   
(.004) 
–.004    
(.004) 
–.004    
(.005) 
–.004    
(.004) 




–.003     
(.001) 
–.001    
(.001) 
–.004    
(.001) 
–.002    
(.001) 




–.003    
(.002) 
–.002    
(.002) 
–.005    
(.002) 
–.002    
(.002) 
–.004    
(.003) 
Pr(University grad.)  –.000    
(.002) 
.001    
(.002) 
–.003    
(.003) 
–.001    
(.002) 
.003    
(.003) 
Pr(High school grad.)  –.000    
(.001) 
.000    
(.000) 
.000    
(.002) 
–.000    
(.001) 




–.001    
(.001) 
.000    
(.001) 
–.001    
(.002) 
–.002    
(.001) 




.003    
(.004) 
.006    
(.005) 
.005    
(.005) 
.008   
(.004)  




–.004    
(.003) 
–.000    
(.001) 
–.000    
(.001) 
–.000    
(.001) 
.001     
(.001) 
Log(Disposable income)  .002    
(.001) 
.003    
(.002) 
.003    
(.002) 
.003    
(.002) 
.001    
(.003) 
Notes: Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the municipality level (286 
cells) in parenthesis. The table reports the coefficient on “Years of exposure”. The sample consists of 
women born 1965–l975. Wherever appropriate, the regressions controls (linearly) for each parent’s 
earnings and age, with dummies for each parent’s education (five levels), for missing information on 
education and earnings, and immigrant status. All regressions include municipality and year of birth 
fixed effects, and linear municipality trends. All outcomes are observed in 2004. Parental characteristics 
are measured in 1985. “Academic family” is defined as having at least one parent who has completed at 
least theoretical/preparatory high school. “High income family” is defined as having at least one parent 
above the median in each parent’s earnings distribution. See Table A 1. for definitions of the included 
variables.  
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While most countries are committed to reducing unintended childbearing, and thereby 
improve the well-being of both mothers and children, there is little consensus on the 
efficiency of different policies.  
This paper examines the consequences a series of Swedish policy changes beginning 
in 1989 where different regions started subsidizing the birth control pill. The reforms 
were significant and applied to all types of oral contraceptives. My identification 
strategy takes advantage of temporal, regional and cohort variation in the implemen-
tation of the subsidy, generating plausibly exogenous variation in access.   
Using county level panel data I find that the subsidy increased sales by some 5–7 
percent and reduced the abortion rate by about 8 percent. The analysis also shows 
tentative evidence of an effect on the birth rate, although the coefficient is only 
significant at the 10 percent level. The estimates are robust to several sensitivity checks. 
Using rich population micro data I also examine the effect on socioeconomic outcomes, 
fertility, and marital status. The results show that women with long-term access to the 
subsidy are 20 percent less likely to have a child before age 21; an effect that is 
significantly stronger for women from poor socioeconomic background. I find no statis-
tically significant effect on number of children, marriage, educational attainment, or 
labor supply, although some of the estimates are rather imprecise.   
From a policy perspective, the results suggest that subsidizing oral contraceptives 
may be a fruitful way to both reduce abortions as well as the incidence of teenage 
childbearing. In this context, it is relevant to ask whether the results in this paper can be 
extended to other settings. Sweden is well-known for its extensive welfare state which 
encompasses a number of measures to assist children and their parents (Björklund 
2006). Child care is heavily subsidized and local governments are obliged to provide 
care to cover the time the parents spend on market work and education. There are 
extensive earnings-related parental leave benefits and parents have the right to reduce 
work hours to 75 percent. There is also a flat rate child allowance.   
With these policies in mind it is perhaps not so surprising to find no significant 
effects on long-term socioeconomic outcomes. It is conceivable that Sweden’s generous 
26 IFAU  – Putting teenagers on the pill: the consequences of subsidized contraception family policy compensates women for the potential detrimental effects of having an 
unplanned child. Thus, it is possible that the consequences of introducing a similar 
reform as the one studied in this paper could be more far-reaching in other countries. 
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Table A 1 Definitions of key variables and data source 
Variable Definition  Data  source 
Teenage mother  Indicator = 1 for having first the child no later than 
age 20; 0 otherwise.  
Multigeneration 
register 
Number of children    Multigeneration 
register 
High school  Indicator variable = 1 for highest completed level of 
education being high school; 0 otherwise.  
Employment 
register 
University  Indicator variable = 1 for highest completed level of 
education being university; 0 otherwise. 
Employment 
register 
Non-employed  Indicator variable = 1 for employment status “not 




Earnings  Labor related income (including self-employment) in 
hundreds of SEK. 
Employment 
register 
Welfare  Indicator variable = 1 for the incidence of welfare; 0 
otherwise. 
LOUISE 
Disposable income  After tax income plus all transfers recieved.   LOUISE 
Currently married  Indicator variable = 1 for currently married; 0 
otherwise. 
LOUISE 
Parental characteristics    
Education  Indicator variable = 1 for highest completed level of 
education; 0 otherwise (5 levels: compulsory school, 
high school ≤ 2 years, high school > 2 years, 
university ≤ 2 years, university > 2 years ).  
Employment 
register 
Earnings  Labor related income (including self-employment) 
measured in hundreds of SEK. 
Employment 
register 
Notes: Parental characteristics are observed in 1985. All other variables are observed in 2004, if not 
indicated otherwise.   
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Table A 2 Summary statistics 
Variable Mean  Standard  deviation 
Teenage mother  .067  .250 
Number of children  1.452  1.151 
High school  .931  .254 
University .423  .494 
Non-employed .176  .381
 
Log(earnings) 7.120  1.161 
Welfare .089  .285 
Log(Disposable income)  7.084  .463 
Currently married  .391  .488 
Exposed 1–18 months  .072  .258 
Exposed 19–36 months  .072  .259 
Exposed 37–54 months  .049  .256 
Exposed > 54 months   .023  .216 
Years of exposure  .650  1.483 
Mother    
Age (in 1985)  41.581     6.148 
Compulsory school  .419  .493 
High school ≤ 2 years  .344 .475 
High school > 2 years   .052  .222 
University ≤ 2 years   .090  .286 
University > 2 years  .094  .292 
Earnings 595.61  406.965 
Father    
Age (in 1985)  44.591      7.080 
Compulsory school  .416  .493 
High school ≤ 2 years  .249 .433 
High school > 2 years   .153  .360 
University ≤ 2 years   .068  .252 
University > 2 years  .114  .318 
Earnings 1079.96  746.11 
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